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INTRODUCTION
Since the launch of China’s ‘Go Global Policy’ in 
2001 the world has observed a dynamic rise in Chi-
na’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in both 
developing as well as developed countries. Western 
Europe became a favoured destination for Chinese 
multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking strategic 
assets such as brands, technology, know-how or dis-
tribution channels. Central Eastern European (CEE) 
countries like Hungary and Poland, which joined the 
EU shortly after this time, attracted mainly Chinese 
greenfield investments aimed at obtaining access to 
the whole EU market, which has changed since 2012 
with Chinese MNCs showing interest in acquisitions. 
In recent years growing concerns and regulatory 
restrictions relating to Chinese investors have been 
seen across the globe, especially among developed 
economies, based on both national security and 
economic grounds.2 We would like to investigate the 
changing motives, location choices as well as employ-
ment generation and human resources management 
approaches of Chinese MNCs in selected host econo-
mies of CEE, namely Hungary and Poland, which have 
attracted the lion share of China’s investment in CEE. 
We also compare Chinese MNCs with Japanese and 
South Korean MNCs that arrived in CEE much earlier 
as of the early 1990s.
CHINESE, JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN 
FDI IN HUNGARY AND POLAND – HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND
Undoubtedly, the change in the institutional setting 
of CEE countries due to European integration has 
been the most important driver of Asian FDI in the 
CEE region. In the manufacturing sector in particular, 
1 This paper was supported by the Bolyai János Fellowship of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and written in the framework of 
the research project ‘Non-European Emerging-market Multinational 
Enterprises in East Central Europe’ (K-120053), supported by the Na-
tional Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary.
2 See https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-
europe.
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however, Asian investors entered the region earlier, 
with some of them even before the fall of the iron 
curtain.
The first phase of inward Asian FDI came parallel 
with the CEE countries’ democratic shift in the late 
1980s: some Japanese and Korean companies (like 
Samsung, Suzuki, Matsushita Electric and Hyundai) 
indicated their willingness to invest in CEE back in the 
early 1980s, while their investments took place during 
the first years of the democratic transition, in the late 
1980s or at the beginning of the 1990s. The second 
impetus was given by the CEE region’s accession 
process to the European Union. EU membership of 
Hungary and Poland (as well as other CEE countries 
joining the EU) allowed Asian investors to avoid trade 
barriers, while the countries also served them as an 
assembly base. Not only membership, but also the 
prospect of their EU accession attracted new Asian 
investors to Hungary and Poland. Some Chinese 
companies like Hisense, for example, made their first 
investments in Hungary before the country officially 
became an EU member state. New investments also 
arrived in the year of accession. The third phase dates 
back to the global economic and financial crisis, when 
financially distressed companies all over Europe were 
often acquired by non-European companies, including 
Chinese firms. Besides the Chinese, some new South 
Korean, South African and Indian MNEs started to 
strengthen their global – as well as CEE – presence in 
these years too.
According to the Amadeus database, as of 2017 
Hungary hosted 83 firms with 51 percent of shares 
held by Japanese owners, 12 firms with their ultimate 
owners in South Korea and 15 firms with their ultimate 
owners in China (there are currently 19 in total due to 
recent investments not yet recorded in the Amadeus 
database). During that time in Poland there were 
211 Japanese firms, 113 Chinese and 75 Korean 
companies. Approximately one third of Chinese firms 
in CEE are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 31 percent 
in Hungary and 28 percent in Poland (see Tables 1 
and 2). Major Japanese investors are Suzuki Motor 
Corp., Sumitomo Group, Toyota, Denso, Matsushita 
Electronic Components, Panasonic, Sanyo, 
Ajinomoto, and Mitsui. The majority of Japanese FDI 
is concentrated in the electronics and automotive 
industries. Japanese investors only recently ex -
panded their interests towards other industries 
like food (Lotte’s acquisition of Wedel and Pijalnie 
Czekolady, Ajinomoto and Nissin – producer of instant 
soups), financial services (Meiji Yasuda’s interest in 
Europa Group and Warta Group), fleet management 
(Hitachi Capital’s acquisition of Corpo Flota) and 
cosmetics (Rohto’s interest in Dax Cosmetics). 
Korean investments are also focused in the electronic 
and automotive industries as well as the chemical 
industry. Samsung, Hankook, LG Chem, Daewoo and 
Nexen are among the major investors. When entering 
the CEE markets, Japanese and Korean MNCs most 
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often choose the greenfield entry mode. Korean MNCs 
initially only engaged in productive investment, but 
recently also carried out research and development 
activities.
Chinese investors typically target the secondary 
and tertiary sectors of CEE countries, including 
Hungary and Poland. Initially, Chinese investment 
flowed mostly into manufacturing (assembly), but 
over time services attracted a growing amount of 
investment too. In Hungary and Poland, for example, 
there are branches of Bank of China, and Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, as well as offices of some 
of the largest law offices in China, Yingke Law Firm 
(in Hungary in 2010, in Poland in 2012) and Dacheng 
Law Offices (in Poland in 2011, in Hungary in 2012). 
Main Chinese investors targeting these countries 
are primarily interested in telecommunications, 
electronics, chemical industry and transportation. 
In addition to the largest investor, Wanhua, major 
investors include Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Lenovo, 
BYD and Comlink.
As far as the Chinese MNCs’ entry modes are 
concerned, greenfield investments dominate and 
were especially common among the first Chinese 
investors in CEE focusing on assembly after 2005 
(Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo, TCL). Mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) gained importance as of 2011 (Wanhua, Liu 
Gong Machinery), while joint ventures were less com-
mon (Orient Solar, BBCA, Shanghai Shenda).
CHINESE, JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN FDI IN 
HUNGARY AND POLAND – MOTIVATION
The main driver behind Asian FDI in CEE is mar-
ket-seeking investment: by entering CEE market 
Asian companies gain access not only to the whole of 
the EU (and domestic) market, but also to the markets 
of CIS, the Mediterranean countries and the EFTA. 
During company interviews, almost all participants 
emphasised their desire to have operations in CEE, 
which can either be linked to their existing business- 
es in Western Europe, or can help strengthen their 
presence in the wider European market. Another 
aspect of EU membership that has induced Asian 
investment in Hungary is institutional stability 
(exemplified by the protection of property rights, for 
instance). It was important for early investors from 
Japan or Korea, but was also one of the drivers of 
Chinese FDI due to the unstable institutional, eco-
nomic and political environment of their home 
country (Morck et al. 2007). It is also in line with the 
findings of Clegg and Voss (2012), who argue that 
Chinese FDI in the EU shows ‘an institutional arbi-
trage strategy’.
While the market-seeking motivation is clearly 
dominant, the efficiency-seeking motive is also 
present, and can be explained by the fact that a skilled 
labour force is available in Hungary and Poland in 
sectors and industries for which Asian interest is 
growing, while labour costs are lower than the EU 
average. However, there are also differences within 
the CEE region; unit labour costs are usually cheaper 
in Bulgaria and Romania than in Hungary and Poland. 
Corporate taxes also play a role in Asian companies’ 
decision to invest in Hungary or Poland, although 
these two countries do not have the most favourable 
tax regime in the CEE region. Nevertheless, these 
labour cost and tax differences within the CEE region 
do not really seem to influence Asian investors, as 
there is more investment from Asian countries in 
Visegrad countries (especially in Hungary and Poland) 
– where labour costs and taxes are comparatively 
higher – than in Romania or Bulgaria. One explanation 
for this may be the theory of agglomeration, as OFDI in 
these countries is generally the highest in the region 
(McCaleb and Szunomár 2017). 
Recently, certain Asian investments have also 
been motivated by the search for brands, new 
technologies or market niches that they can fill in 
on European markets, i.e. by strategic asset seeking. 
Examples include the acquisition of Hungarian 
BorsodChem, a chemicals producer by Wanhua, 
Dongren Investment Co. Ltd. The Bonded Zone has 
also purchased a 33-percent-stake in the Polish 
Bioton, biotechnology company, which produces 
insulin among other products (Ningbo.gov.cn 2016). 
Another interesting feature is that personal contacts 
were also important when choosing a host country 
for Asian FDI in the CEE region. For example, one 
of the Japanese investors chose Hungary because 
the owner’s child studied in the country for several 
years, while a South Korean investment in Hungary 
was initiated through a former Hungarian Olympic 
champion. Besides, Asian companies also appreciate 
it when a business agreement is supported by the 
host country’s government. Strategic agreements 
with foreign companies investing in Hungary offered 
by the Hungarian government may also have spurred 
Asian investment in Hungary as a result.
McCaleb and Szunomár (2017) also found that, in 
the case of Chinese MNEs’ motives in CEE, institutional 
factors and other less-quantifiable aspects play a 
significant role. Besides EU membership, market 
opportunities and qualified, but cheaper labour, 
key factors include the size and feedback of Chinese 
ethnic minority in the host country, investment 
incentives and subsidies, opportunities to acquire 
visa and permanent residence permits, privatisation 
opportunities, as well as the quality of political 
relations and the government’s willingness to 
cooperate.
CHINESE, JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN 
FDI IN HUNGARY AND POLAND – INDUSTRIES, 
LOCATIONS, LINKING WITH GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
As of 2018, the Chinese MNCs in CEE mainly represent 
electronics, automotive, industrial machinery, 
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chemicals and rubber 
products manufacturing 
(Tables 1 and 2). The industrial 
characteristic of Chinese FDI 
is similar to its Japanese and 
South Korean counterparts, 
which are dominated by 
firms from electronics and 
automotive industries. Since 
2012 Chinese investors 
have been entering the CEE 
markets more frequently 
through acquisitions, with 
the latter also resulting from 
M&As carried out in third 
countries like the United 
States and Germany, which 
included the targeted firm’s 
foreign subsidiaries. These 
acquisitions in industries like 
the automotive sector, with its 
highly fragmented production 
networks, imply China’s 
accelerated entry into global value chains. In 2018, 
a share of 23 percent and 17 percent of the Chinese 
firms analysed were in automotive sector in Poland 
and Hungary respectively (Amadeus database). This 
not only means that Chinese firms have acquired the 
manufacturing technology and skills necessary for 
China’s automotive industry to build a competitive 
advantage in domestic and global markets, but 
may also signal the arrival of Chinese cars in the 
EU market in near future. This, in turn, would imply 
more Asian competitors in the European car market. 
In this respect Japanese and South Korean MNCs 
differ, as they bring their own brands, products, and 
manufacturing methods, which constitute the basis 
of competitive advantage. The lead firms like Toyota, 
Samsung, LG also bring with them suppliers from their 
home country, which means that they make a limited 
contribution to the development of host country 
firms.
The location choice of Chinese MNCs in CEE 
follows the pattern of total FDI. In Poland, for 
example, the voivodships (provinces) that have 
attracted most of the foreign direct investment are 
mazowieckie, slaskie, dolnoslaskie and wielkopolskie 
(Kacperska 2014). The largest number of Chinese 
firms is registered in mazowieckie, wielkopolskie, 
malopolskie and pomorskie, in that order. Slaskie, 
dolnoslaskie, mazowieckie, malopolskie and 
wielkopolskie are the leading voivodships hosting the 
automotive industry in Poland. Chinese firms from 
the automotive sector, which are usually result from 
acquisitions in third countries, are located mainly in 
malopolskie, wielkopolskie and mazowieckie (Table 
2). Japanese and Korean firms in Poland are driven 
by incentives offered by the special economic zones 
in their location choice. In Hungary, the capital city of 
Budapest is an important hub for foreign investments 
with concentration of firms from telecommunications, 
electronics, motor vehicles and their parts, industrial 
machinery manufacturing, chemicals and education. 
However, central as well as Northern Hungary and 
Western Transdanubia are also favoured by Chinese 
MNCs (Table 1). Korean and Japanese MNCs in Hungary 
choose slightly different locations to Chinese MNCs. In 
addition to Budapest, they are also located in Central 
Transdanubia, the latter hosts firms manufacturing 
electronics and tyres like Harman Becker, Hankook 
and Lotte.
CHINESE, JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN 
FDI IN HUNGARY AND POLAND – GENERATING 
EMPLOYMENT
Chinese firms contribute to the generation of em -
ployment, but mainly preserve jobs through acqui-
sitions. The largest Chinese employers in Hungary 
are local firms purchased by Chinese MNCs, although 
some Chinese greenfield investors also became 
significant employers in recent years. Based on 
the employment data for Chinese firms in Hungary 
(Amadeus database),3 47 percent of them increased 
their employment rate since the year of their 
establishment until 2017, 10 percent maintained their 
number of employees, while 5 percent decreased 
the number of employees. The Chinese firm Wanhua 
that acquired Borsodchem is the biggest Chinese 
employer in Hungary with 3,000 workers, followed by 
the Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group, which 
purchased Bosch’s SEG Automotive Germany GmbH 
3 For Poland no data on employment in recent years is available as 
reporting number of employees is not required by law thus no infor-
mation in Amadeus database.
Table 1  
 
 
Location of Chinese MNCs in Hungary 
Voivod-
ship/province 
Total  
19 firms 
Company 
type 
Main industries Entry 
modes 
Budapest, cen-
tral Hungary 
12 3 SOEs Telecommunications; whole-
sale of computers, computer 
peripheral equipment and soft-
ware, motor vehicle and motor 
vehicle parts, farm product raw 
material, chemical products, 
industrial machinery and 
equipment; transport, consult-
ing services; Industrial machin-
ery manufacturing; education 
Green-
field, 
M&A 
Pest 3 1 SOE Telecommunication and info 
communication; electric light-
ing equipment manufacturing; 
Industrial machinery manufac-
turing 
M&A 
Northern Hun-
gary 
3 2 SOEs Wholesale of chemicals; motor 
vehicle parts manufacturing 
M&A, 
green-
field 
Western Trans-
danubia 
1  Rubber product manufacturing  
Source: Own compilation based on Amadeus database and news articles. 
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at the end of 2017, the former Robert Bosch Starter 
Motors Generators Holding GmbH, which employs 
1,700 workers, and Midea that acquired German 
KUKA with its foreign subsidiaries in late 2016 with 
1,576 employees followed by BYD with 191 employees 
and Lexmark International Technology acquired by 
Apex Technology and PAG Asia Capital from China 
in 2016 with 372 employees. Huawei in Hungary 
outsources assembly activities to the Hungarian 
branch of Foxconn, therefore directly they employ 
around 300 people but indirectly – through Foxconn 
– they are responsible for the employment of more 
than 2,500.
Unlike Chinese investors, Japanese and 
Korean firms in Hungary contribute to generating 
employment as they enter the Hungarian market 
through greenfield investments aimed at assembly, 
which implies training the company’s workforce from 
the scratch. Japanese MNCs in Hungary generally 
increased employment over the last 10 years. The 
leaders are Denso (producer of parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles) with 4,716 employees in 2018, 
Suzuki with 2,744 employees in 2017 and Ibiden 
with 2,464 employees in 2018. The majority of South 
Korean MNCs have also increased employment in the 
last decade, with the largest Korean employers being 
Hankook (3,071 workers in 2017), Harman Becker, a 
subsidiary of Samsung Electronics (2,454 workers) 
and Samsung Electronics (1,598 workers) – see 
Amadeus database.
CHINESE, JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN FDI 
IN HUNGARY AND POLAND – HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT
When analysing East Asian investors’ activities in 
Hungary and Poland, we have to examine the impact 
of cultural differences and cross-cultural business 
encounters. The most important factors in such 
encounters are the level of individualism versus 
collectivism, the degree of respect for hierarchy, the 
role of networks and work ethics (Hall and Wailes 
2010). To map out whether – and if so, how – the 
East Asian multinational companies reproduce or 
Table 2  
 
 
Location Choice of Chinese MNCs in Poland 
Voivod-
ship/province 
90a, number of 
firms in auto-
motive industry 
Company 
type 
Main industries Entry modes 
mazowieckie 43, 3 automo-
tive 
12 are 
SOEs 
Telecommunications, chemical products, computers, 
motor vehicles and motor parts wholesalers, semi-
conductors and other electronics, industrial machin-
ery, fruit and vegetable juice manufacturing, residen-
tial building construction, hotels, services 
M&As carried 
out abroad, 
greenfield 
wielkopolskie 10, 4 automo-
tive 
3 SOE Motor vehicle parts manufacturing; automotive 
equipment rental and leasing; automotive repair and 
maintenance; agricultural chemical manufacturing; 
machinery and equipment wholesalers; services 
Greenfield, JV, 
M&A carried 
out abroad 
malopolskie 8, 6 automotive 4 SOEs Manufacture of electric motors, generators, and 
transformers, motor vehicle parts, rubber products, 
sports goods, fruit and vegetable juice; services 
M&A directly in 
Poland and 
carried out 
abroad 
pomorskie 8, 2 automotive 2 SOEs Transportation and real estate services; manufactur-
ing of motor vehicle parts, industrial trucks and trac-
tors, iron and steel mills. 
Mostly green-
field 
slaskie 6, 2 automotive 1 SOE,  
2 state  
related 
Motor vehicle parts manufacturing; wholesale of 
waste and scrap; construction; wholesale 
M&A 
dolnoslaskie 4, 1 automotive 1 SOE Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical 
products, motor vehicle parts, steel pipes, tubes; 
electronic and precision equipment repair 
M&As carried 
out abroad, 
greenfield 
lodzkie 3, 1 automotive 0 SOE Casting of light metals; machinery, equipment and 
motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts and supplies 
wholesalers 
Greenfield 
podkarpackie 2, 1 automotive 1 SOE Agriculture, construction and mining machinery man-
ufacturing; treatment and coating of metals 
M&As 
kujawsko-po-
morskie 
2 1 SOE Waste management services; hardware, plumbing 
and heating equipment wholesalers and metal prod-
uct manufacturing 
M&A through 
Germany 
lubuskie 2, 1 automotive O SOE Packaging and labelling services; plastics product 
manufacturing 
M&A, green-
field 
lubelskie 1 1 SOE Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving 
elements 
M&As 
opolskie 1 private Food services Greenfield 
   a Chinese firms were analysed out of total 113. These are the top 90 Chinese firms in Poland in terms of revenue. 
Source: Own compilation based on Amadeus database. 
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adapt their management methods and practices 
across their subsidiaries, we shall focus on human 
resource management (HRM), which is perhaps the 
most important issue when analysing the interaction 
between home and host country culture and 
institutions (Ozsvald et al. 2018).
Although there are several differences between 
East Asian investors’ HRM activity in the CEE region, 
there are also some similarities too. In general, we can 
say that East Asian firms in Poland and Hungary try – 
at least to some extent – to apply their own HR system 
and use the host country system only if it is absolutely 
necessary. For example, what is fairly typical for 
Japanese, Korean and Chinese companies is a low 
level of organisation among workers and low union 
density. The majority of their CEE-based companies/
branches have so-called works councils, but their 
role is rather limited. In some cases, factory activity 
is outsourced to another company, therefore there is 
not even any need to establish such a body. East Asian 
companies respect their host country’s labour law, 
but if possible, they use the opportunities provided 
by it to minimise labour-related costs. For example, 
they tend to pay relatively low wages to workers who 
they recruit, although subsidiary-level coordination in 
wages exists in almost all cases. Working conditions 
are similar to those of other companies operating in 
the same sector, but differences do exist. East Asian 
companies in CEE, for example, use the open office 
system, and not only for lower-level managers, but 
in several cases for their top management too. New 
employees’ certificates, diplomas or experience are 
often not appreciated enough in the view of workers. 
The main basis for promotion and pay rises is seniority 
– or loyalty demonstrated by the number of years 
spent working for a firm – in almost all cases, while 
relationships (guangxi) also play a role, especially in 
Chinese companies. East Asian firms expect their own 
working style, which is characterised by dedication 
to work, working overtime, or being available by 
telephone in case of emergency. Individualism 
and bottom-up initiatives are not typical in 
these companies. Decisions are taken mostly by 
headquarters, meaning that CEE subsidiaries tend to 
have an executive function with little space for host-
country initiatives.
Employing a large share of expatriates also seems 
to be characteristic for East Asian companies, as the 
number of expats is rather high in both the Polish 
and Hungarian subsidiaries, especially in the first 
few years following investment in the acquisition of 
a company. In a Chinese company that arrived in the 
region over 10 years ago, for example, almost half 
of the managerial staff are still Chinese expatriates. 
In the case of a Japanese automotive factory that 
arrived over 25 years ago, by contrast, the number 
of expatriates is declining, although still high. 
Similar characteristics emerge in the case of Korean 
companies: a company in electronics that arrived in 
the late 1980s now has a few Korean expats at the 
top management levels, while another company in 
automotive that arrived a few years ago in the region, 
employs a far higher number of Korean expatriates. 
Expatriates are not always solely responsible for 
a certain task or field, and in some cases they have 
co-managers from the host country.
As host country and home country employees 
from different cultural backgrounds have to work 
together and cooperate in these companies, this 
makes cultural training inevitable. East Asian 
expatriates are usually given training in European 
cultural competences before taking up an expat 
position. Host country employees also learn about 
the investor’s country, culture and habits, although 
usually not via deep and detailed courses, but 
rather through general presentations. Cross-cultural 
training courses are, however, not very common in 
these companies, although several HR managers have 
indicated that there is a clear need for such courses. 
Polish employees at a Poland-based Japanese 
company reported that the communication between 
Japanese employees and their local counterparts is 
very poor. This can be explained to some extent by 
Japanese workers’ poor command of English and 
their lack of familiarity with the local culture. In order 
to remedy this situation, the Japanese Embassy in 
Poland organised Sakura Business Seminars for firms 
with Japanese stakeholders to give Polish employees 
a better understanding of the Japanese business 
style. To respond to similar problems, Chinese and 
Korean companies also try to organise, for example, 
social events for their colleagues, so as they can get 
to know each other better. 
CONCLUSION
Chinese MNCs emerged as a new third important 
player in terms of investment from East Asia in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Chinese MNCs are similar to 
Japanese and South Korean counterparts in market-
seeking motivation related to the establishment of 
greenfield investments for assembly. These Chinese 
firms are mostly from the electronics industry, 
while Japanese and South Koreans are from both 
the electronics and the automotive sector. The 
differences between Chinese, Japanese and South 
Korean FDI lie in Chinese firms’ search of strategic 
assets (technology, brands, distribution channels) 
and their entry into global production networks, 
which is especially visible in automotive industry. 
It is related to their growing entry into CEE through 
M&As, while Japanese and Korean MNCs choose the 
greenfield entry mode as they are already part of those 
value chains – thanks to their earlier maturity and 
ownership of technologies, and globally recognised 
brands that their Chinese counterparts are about to 
join. Chinese MNCs seem to exhibit a different strategy 
to that pursued by Japanese and South Korean MNCs, 
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whereby the leading firm is followed into foreign 
markets by home country suppliers as through M&As 
of producers of automotive parts and components, 
Chinese MNCs establish suppliers first and their lead 
firms are expected to arrive in Europe in near future. 
Japanese and South Korean MNCs thus benefit more 
than the host economies in CEE, as they create more 
jobs than Chinese investors. These three East Asian 
MNCs, however, use similar techniques and strategies 
in human resources management in terms of the level 
of individualism versus collectivism, the degree of 
respect for hierarchy, the role of networks, as well 
as work ethics. The increasing number of Chinese 
firms entering the automotive industry through 
M&As implies the possible emergence of a third Asian 
car player in Europe in near future. Like Japanese 
and South Korean MNCs that are followed by their 
suppliers and service companies – which does not 
contribute to the development of host country firms 
– Chinese firms prefer to cooperate with companies 
from their home country. As a result, there are very 
little or limited opportunities for local enterprise 
development via linkages with suppliers, for example.
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